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POST-SOCIALIST HOUSING SYSTEMS IN EUROPE: HOUSING WELFARE 
REGIMES BY DEFAULT? 
Abstract 
This article develops a conceptual framework derived from welfare regime and concomitant 
literatures to interpret housing reform in post-socialist European countries. In it, settled power 
structures and collective ideologies are necessary prerequisites for the creation of distinctive 
housing welfare regimes with clear roles for the state, market and households. Although the 
defining feature of post-socialist housing has been mass-privatization to create super-
homeownership societies, the emphatic retreat of the state that this represents has not been 
replaced by the creation of the institutions or cultures required to create fully financialized 
housing markets. There is, instead, a form of state legacy welfare in the form of debt free 
home-ownership, which creates a gap in housing welfare that has been partially filled by 
households in the form of intergenerational assistance (familiailism) and self-build housing. 
Both of these mark continuities with the previous regime. The latter is especially common in 
south-east Europe where its frequent illegality represents a form of anti-state housing. The 
lack of settled ideologies and power structures suggest that these housing welfare regimes by 
default will persist as part of a process that resembles a path dependent „transformation‟ 
rather than „transition.‟ 
1. Introduction 
It is almost 25 years since the communist system collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Despite its pivotal role in socialist systems and in their reform, housing is largely absent from 
the mainstream „transition‟ literature. Nonetheless, there is now an extensive housing studies 
literature on post-socialist housing, which provides insights into particular aspects of reform. 
The principal aim of this article is to provide an historically-grounded explanatory 
interpretation of reform by adapting and applying the welfare and housing regime 
frameworks of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny to the post-socialist countries. A secondary aim 
is to use the findings to inform the understanding of „transition‟. 
The starting point is a literature review (section 2) followed by the construction of a 
conceptual framework through which to interpret socialist and post-socialist housing (section 
3). This suggests that power and ideology work through existing institutional structures to 
produce the tenure and finance systems that will determine the fundamental nature of post-
socialist housing. The framework is applied to socialist housing systems (section 4), in turn to 
post-socialist tenure structures, where power and ideology combined to underpin mass 
privatization (section 5) and then to housing finance systems which indicate that post-
socialist housing remains far from being financialized (section 6). The lack of a financialized 
housing market places an onus on the role of the household as a source of housing welfare 
(section 7). The implications of the analysis are discussed in the concluding section (8). 
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2. From institutional economics to regime theory  
Institutional economics has provided the dominant framework for prescribing policy 
responses for and analysing changes in post-socialist countries. The collapse of communism 
in Europe coincided with the high point of the „Washington Consensus.‟ This suggested that 
the successful transition to a market economy would be achieved by a series of institutional 
reforms in the spirit of those believed to have provided the springboard for the industrial 
revolution (North and Weingast, 1989). Adapting this approach to housing, the World Bank 
(1993) outlined the institutional basis of an efficient market system. This work, which can be 
characterised as housing‟s End of History, featured the classic liberal mix of establishing 
property rights, a mortgage finance system and targeted subsidies. But in the central piece of 
advice to post-socialist governments was to privatize public housing in favour of home-
ownership (see Buckley et al., 1995; Renaud, 1995). Privatization, in turn prompted 
prescriptions for the development of the housing finance systems that would be needed to 
underpin home-ownership as housing markets developed. Privatization and the institutions 
required for an efficient housing finance system therefore provided the yardsticks against 
which transition countries could be assessed (e.g. Buckley and Tsenkova, 2001; Roy, 2008). 
This framework is underpinned by the assumption that „transition‟ is a convergent process 
away from state socialism and towards liberal capitalism (Kemeny and Lowe, 1998). 
However, while tenure change and housing finance institutions (uncontroversially) form vital 
parts of (post-socialist) housing systems, they do not in themselves explain them. As is 
apparent from Stephens‟ (2010) comparison of housing reform in urban China and Europe‟s 
transition countries, in themselves institutional variations in finance institutions tell us little 
about the nature of the emerging housing system. To search for causes of housing systems, 
we can turn to the explanatory theories of Esping-Andersen‟s welfare regimes and Kemeny‟s 
housing typologies. This choice requires some justification, not least because we draw on 
these works in order to explain the development of housing systems, but not their relationship 
with wider welfare systems.  
The extensive literature spawned by Esping-Andersen (1990; see Norris and Stephens, 2014) 
has prompted critiques and refinements that add to his typologies of liberal, conservative and 
social democratic regimes (e.g. the „rudimentary‟ south of Europe, and „productivist‟ south-
east Asian regimes); it has introduced explicit concern for gender utilising concepts such as 
„defamilialisation‟; and extended the analysis to include income in-kind, including public 
housing (see Bambra, 2007). Although there are antecedents (notably Donnison, 1967), 
recent housing literature broadly falls into studies that attempt a direct application of Esping-
Andersen to housing (e.g. Kurz and Blossfeld, 2004; Allen, et al, 2004), and those that have 
followed Kemeny‟s (1995) rental regime typology. Meanwhile an increased interest in south-
east Asia and the „old world‟ housing boom that preceded the Global Financial Crisis 
prompted specific interest in the welfare-creating qualities of housing as an asset (e.g. 
Ronald, 2008; Ronald and Elsinga, 2011). Nonetheless there has been a tendency to employ 
regimes as forms of mere categorisation (Kemeny, 2001), whilst there have been efforts to 
turn attention towards outcomes (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2014) and causality (Stephens and 
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van Steen, 2011) as well as explorations of the relationship between the housing and welfare 
systems (Kemeny 2005; Castles 1998; Doling and Horsewood 2011).  
For our purposes a key value of the welfare/housing regime framework lies in the 
identification of the power structures and ideologies that cause housing systems to evolve 
and differ between one another. Thus Esping-Andersen‟s welfare regimes reflect underlying 
power structures that produce welfare systems with necessary distributional outcomes. 
Kemeny‟s housing typologies reflect the underlying societal ideologies of „privatism‟ and 
„collectivism‟ which produce policy frameworks from which (in the west) either „dualist‟ 
ownership or „unitary‟ rental societies emerge. Although they identify different causes of 
regimes, their typologies reveal a remarkable congruence (for example, Esping-Andersen‟s 
social democratic and corporatist countries tend to be Kemeny‟s unitary housing systems, 
while liberal welfare regimes always coincide with dualist housing systems). This may 
indicate that in stable western democracies at least, political power also reflects the 
underlying ideologies of a society via the competitive electoral process. We therefore propose 
a synthesis of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny in which both power and ideology help us to 
interpret housing reform. 
Power and collective ideology in turn shape the relative roles of state, market and family in 
the provision of welfare. Privatization has been interpreted as part of a wider manifestation of 
„policy collapse‟ (Pichler-Milanovich, 2001) in which the role of the state is much reduced. 
In turn, identifying the role of the market becomes crucial, and is the subject of an important 
article in the „varieties of capitalism‟ tradition. Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) argue that 
housing systems can be judged by the way in which they connect households to global 
financial markets. They posit that housing systems have two „objective dimensions‟ relevant 
to political economy: (i) the level of home-ownership that reflects different permutations of 
the state-market-family components in welfare regime literature; and (ii) the extent to which 
housing finance is „constrained‟ or „liberal‟. The authors apply simple variations from 
average levels of home-ownership and levels of mortgage debt prevailing in the 19 OECD 
countries to establish categorisations. Post-socialist countries were divided between those 
with high ownership levels combined with low debt (characterised as „familial‟) and those 
with low ownership and low debt (characterised as „state developmentalist‟).  
This framework is substantially defective. First, the data for home-ownership and mortgage 
debt are based on the average „prevailing‟ over the decade from 1992, but calculated as the 
average of two years (1992 and 2002). The data therefore are likely to underestimate rapid 
change particularly in post-socialist countries which are „transitional,‟ but also in other 
countries where mortgage debt grew rapidly. Second, by ending in 2002, the data (now) miss 
more than a decade of transition in the post-socialist countries, as well as the peak of the 
boom and subsequent financial crisis. Third, the benchmark composed of the OECD average 
(and excluding the transition countries) seems both amorphous and arbitrary. Fourth, to 
characterise all low debt, high ownership countries as „familial‟ risks the erroneous 
imputation of western regime types (in this case southern European, see Allen, 2006) on the 
basis of observed tenure/ finance patterns. Clearly, there is a fundamental difference between 
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low debt ownership where the family is the resource behind the tenure and where this role 
was fulfilled by the one-off policy of the state (via large-scale privatization). Therefore the 
role of the family and household should also be explored further. 
3. Conceptual framework and methods 
The literature suggests a need for a conceptual framework that links causal factors (power, 
ideology) with the nature of the resultant housing system involving the roles of the state, 
market and family/ households.  
After Kemeny, ideology is an important cause of housing regimes. But, in contrast to the way 
in which Kemeny perceives ideological influence as being relatively stable and internal, we 
should allow for society‟s collective values not to be fully-formed, or indeed in flux, giving 
increased scope for external sources of ideological influence. Clearly, the role of international 
players as active competitors for ideological primacy cannot be ignored. Second, after 
Esping-Andersen, power forms another cause of housing regimes. However, power also may 
be partly external. This could take a „hard‟ form, as with the influence of the Soviet Union, or 
the softer form of dependence on western „technical assistance‟. It too can be in flux.  
In applying our framework to the post-socialist countries, we expect power and ideology to 
be connected, whilst not necessarily coterminous as is normally the case in mature liberal 
democracies (and one-party states). In the post-socialist countries, factors including the 
degree of flux following the abrupt break in the economic and political system, the „weak 
state‟ phenomenon, and exposure to external influences, mean that power and ideology may 
diverge. Moreover, power and ideology are mediated through existing institutional structures, 
so reform is subject to path dependency. Path dependence may be a source of divergence, or 
at least „soften‟ convergence (Doling, 1997). Consequently, we begin our study with an 
historically-grounded account of the socialist era housing systems. 
Thus mediated, power and ideology influence the principal institutional features of housing 
systems in ways that that reflect the roles of the three classic sources of welfare: the state, 
market and households/ family. Tenure epitomises the role of the state, but also requires a 
concern for the nature of property rights associated with tenures in specific contexts. This 
allows for the distinctive nature of socialist-era tenures and their continuing influence on their 
post-socialist counterparts. The nature of tenure is shaped by the finance system and wider 
housing market, above its legal construct. The market plays a key role in transforming (or 
not) legal property rights into a form of asset based welfare through the process of 
„financialization‟1. Taken together, the nature of tenure and its relationship with finance 
reflect the role of the state and the market as sources of (housing) welfare. 
                                                          
1
 Financialization ‘means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial incentives, 
financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international economies’ (Epstein, 
2005: 3). 
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We then seek to establish the role that the household plays as a source of (housing) welfare. 
We distinguish between inter-generational support, which implies familialism, and self-help 
where resources are coming from within the household and do not necessarily contain an 
inter-generational component. We note that familialism can be either supported (by the state) 
or unsupported (familialism „by default‟; Sacroceno and Keck, 2010).  
The exercise is approached in six stages. 
First, the examination of housing in the socialist era relies on published research. The 
dominance of the Soviet Union over almost all of the countries removes many complexities 
relating to power and ideology. The legal nature of socialist tenure is well-documented in 
historical and social science literature. The limited research that was undertaken during the 
socialist period provides vital evidence on the distribution of housing. The absence of risk-
based finance in socialist countries removes this factor from their analysis. Contextual 
information is used to consider how legitimate it is to generalise from specific research in a 
few countries. 
Second, the ideological aspects to post-socialist housing reform are reflected in the literature 
published by international agencies most active in the region, namely the World Bank and, in 
Russia, USAID (financially assisted by the World Bank). Third, ways in which international 
agencies related to power is established by examining how and why large-scale housing 
privatization was implemented on the ground. Again a large number of countries can be 
examined because of the relative uniformity of the policy, with the small number of variants 
being capable of separate examination. 
Fourth, how power and ideology informed the financial structures surrounding housing is 
more problematic due to the large variety of financial intermediaries that emerged. However, 
the key to interpreting the financial aspects of housing lies not so much in the mechanisms of 
intermediation, but in the way in which they contribute to converting housing wealth into a 
form of asset based welfare. A wider, and more appropriately benchmarked, set of indicators 
than those employed by Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) is required. These are available from 
EU-SILC or published over a long period in a large number of the countries: the scale of 
owner occupation, including balance between outright and mortgaged ownership, mortgage 
debt as a share of GDP, long-term trends in real house prices and their volatility, as well as 
the level of housing transactions. These indicators can be interpreted as follows. A country 
with large scale home-ownership, supported by a high level of mortgage debt, strong real 
house price growth and a high level of transactions would be one where housing is a liquid 
economic resource, and materially different from socialist-era ownership and renting. In 
contrast, housing in a country with the opposite characteristics would be a largely dormant 
resource, more like socialist-era ownership.  
Fifth, to identify those components of „familialism‟ that are likely to reflect a pooling of 
housing resources between generations we interrogated EU-SILC and employed the 
following indicators: proportion of households that are extended families, children living in 
extended families, households with adult children resident (indicating a later age of leaving 
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home) and proportions of older (65+) single people who live with other people.  Additionally, 
we used the Survey of Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to identify other forms of 
inter-generational housing assistance (notably cash transfers). 
Sixth, to identify self-help, we obtained statistics from country experts on the level of self-
built housing in some countries, which was supplemented with published evidence. The 
emphasis is on identifying self-built housing where there the household puts in a substantial 
part of the work (as opposed to self-provision where the work is contracted out) (Harris, 
1999). 
Where possible, the countries are benchmarked against one another both individually and 
through the use of the broadly accepted welfare regime and geographical groupings. We have 
also sub-divided the post-socialist countries into such geographical groupings (although in 
contrast to Mandic, 2010, we also examine the countries individually, which allows for intra-
group comparison). 
4. Ideology and power in socialist housing systems 
For almost 75 years in the case of the USSR and, about 40 years in the case of the central 
European countries, housing formed a key „nexus‟ in the socialist economic and social model 
(Smith, 2010). The socialist economies prioritised industrialisation over consumption. When 
combined with the ideology of equality, the consequence was wage structures that were 
relatively flat, but the „individual wage‟ system ensured that they were also low. Since wages 
were insufficient to support a family, a dependence on in-kind benefits was firmly established 
and hence could be used as a system of social control (Kornai, 1992). Since items of 
collective consumption were often delivered through the workplace, employment assumed an 
even more central role in welfare than in the western welfare states. With the merger of state 
and party and the state‟s control over the economy, dependence on the state was nearly 
absolute, and the consequence of losing employment in a system where „unemployment‟ did 
not officially exist - the workless being „parasites‟ (Stephenson, 2006) - was severe.   
However, the priority accorded to industrial investment required housing consumption to be 
suppressed. This was experienced most acutely during the period of inter-war 
industrialisation in the Soviet Union (1928-41) when „housing conditions were sacrificed 
utterly to the higher needs of five-year plans‟ (Smith, 2010: 8), and the government 
effectively purchased two years of industrial investment by allowing housing standards for 
urban workers to fall by about 40 per cent (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982). Shortages 
remained endemic in a system that was geared towards industrial investment (Hegedüs and 
Tosics, 1998) and these prompted the emergence of „primitive‟ markets (illegal sub-lets, self-
build, etc.) (Lowe, 2003).  Thus markets and households remained as sources of welfare in a 
regime that was dominated by the state. This helps to explain why from the 1930s the radical 
rejection of the family was reversed and indeed families „drew closer together for self-
protection‟ (Fitzpatrick, 1999: 140). The notion of a „personal life‟ (a family realm remaining 
open to public scrutiny) was accepted, not least because „the state lacked the resources for a 
full social welfare system, [so] the family remained the basic institution of social welfare‟ 
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(Fuges, 2007: 142). Deep subsidies were required for the state (or state enterprise)-owned 
apartments, as the individual wage system demanded that housing became „a ration provided 
with wages‟ (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982: 107).  Rents were kept at exceptionally low 
levels, representing only two or three percent of incomes and falling far short of management 
and maintenance costs (Emms, 1990). As labour income varied only marginally the main 
source of stratification in socialist societies centred on access to social security and 
„privileges‟ (Crompton, 1998). Those who were not loyal to the prevailing political ideology 
had difficulty in finding work commensurate with their capabilities, or securing suitable 
housing (Večerník and Matějů, 1999).  
Although some commentators stress the „exceptionally equal outcomes‟ (Smith, 2010: 92) in 
these housing systems they were systematically differentiated. Szelenyi‟s (1983) survey data 
from 1968 showed that in Hungary status was related to housing tenure, with high level 
bureaucrats and salaried intellectuals being far more likely to be housed in state apartments 
and co-operatives, whilst the inverse was true of owner occupation where unskilled workers 
were much more likely to be housed. He found that high-level bureaucrats and intellectuals 
paid less for their housing, and this pattern remained if income rather than occupational status 
was used. Moreover, he found that while housing standards rose across the board (within 
Hungary), between 1950 and 1968 housing inequalities widened because standards for higher 
status groups improved more quickly than those of unskilled workers. 
The rationale for this phenomenon was fundamental to the operation of the wider social and 
economic system:  
If income inequalities have been set at a social minimum, it is not rational or remotely 
practicable to reduce these… by distributing housing benefits inversely with income. 
If there is no market and all housing is „social‟, it is practically unavoidable that 
housing must become a positive part of the reward system (Szelenyi, 1983: 78).  
Later research by Bodnár and Böröcz (1998: 1296), which focused on housing inequalities in 
Hungary three years before the fall of socialism, found that one key source of housing 
inequality was „the extent of informal social networks to [sic] people with higher education, 
beyond the well-known normative advantages associated with educational and political 
affiliation.‟ There were very few such critical studies in other socialist states but, for 
example, the situation found in Hungary has been confirmed by Alexeev (1988) for the 
Soviet Union and Rákosník (2010) for the Czech Republic. Nonetheless, Zavisca‟s (2012) 
multivariate analysis suggests that in the final years of the Soviet Union demographic 
variables were then the key to explaining the odds of a household living in a separate 
apartment. 
Some commentators have questioned whether the socialist countries ever represented a 
„distinct cluster‟ because the state rental housing across the region as a whole averaged only 
20-30 per cent of the total (Lowe, 2003: xvi). However, the similarity in the fundamental 
nature of ownership and renting was such that, behind these „crude tenure structures‟ (ibid.) 
lay a distinct housing system. 
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State-apartments were in a crucial sense decommodified because they were not allocated by 
market mechanisms. They also provided extraordinarily high levels of security. As Smith 
observed, Soviet state tenants „could also claim a de facto form of individual ownership, and 
as the already secure terms of occupancy became ever more robust… this became close to 
watertight possession‟ (2010: 19). Thus the rights connected with tenancies „equalled or 
exceeded in many ways those conventionally associated with ownership and certainly were 
far stronger than those associated with conventional tenancy in United States‟ (Marcuse 
1996: 135). Tenancy rights could be inherited or transferred to relatives, or exchanged with 
some other holders of user rights, so creating a form of „quasi-homeownership‟ (Hegedüs et 
al., 1996). 
Moreover, the continuation of owner-occupied housing in fact fitted rather well within 
socialist housing systems. The notion of „private property‟, in the sense that private gain 
could not be attained (legally) through the ownership of property, was abolished. Instead 
what is referred to as „owner occupied‟ housing fell into the category of „personal property‟ 
(in contrast to the „socialist property‟ for housing owned by the state). Smith characterises 
this tenure as „something akin to a medium-term leasehold largely stripped of any cash-
generating potential‟ (2010: 19). Whilst property could be transferred (by sale, gift, rental or 
legacy) transactions were organised in such a way that housing could not produce private 
profit or wealth. The logic was that since housing was derived from labour it was only for 
personal use (Smith, 2010). So, to borrow Kemeny‟s western typology, the socialist systems 
operated a kind of „unitary‟ housing market, with the key difference being that it occurred 
between renting and owning (rather than between market and cost renting) and  was achieved 
by an enhancement of tenants‟ rights and a diminution of owner-occupiers‟ rights compared 
to those commonly found in western systems.  
Nor was home-ownership a deviation from the socialist system. Self-built housing was the 
mainstay of the interwar Soviet housing system, and was also crucial in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, when it was backed by state credits. Smith notes how „[h]istorians might 
have taken little note of this conspicuous policy of state-backed individual construction, but 
contemporary observers noticed its extent and influence‟ (2010: 36). Although the mass 
building programme marginalised self-build‟s importance (indeed it was banned in Soviet 
cities with populations over 100,000 in 1963), it became an important feature of some of the 
central European countries, particularly as economic performance declined in the 1970s (e.g. 
Hungary); in parts of south east Europe (e.g. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania) it remained 
important throughout the socialist period (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982). Thus, in the 1980s, 
self-built housing accounted for more than 60 per cent of housing construction in Yugoslavia 
and more than half in Hungary, around 45 per cent in Albania, about one-third in Poland and 
one-fifth in Bulgaria (Soaita, 2013). Finance was provided by banking institutions, often on 
generous terms, but it was not risk-based and remained unconnected to enhancing liquidity 
(Struyk, 2000). In such cases it represented a form of supported self-help. Much lower levels 
of self-build were recorded in the USSR and the DDR (Mandic, 2010; Soaita, 2013). Co-
operatives provided an alternative means of mobilising personal resources to meet housing 
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needs, and were encouraged in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the DDR as economies struggled 
from the 1970s (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982). A further element in the socialist housing 
system was the dacha / summer home, permitted only for temporary residence and allocated 
through enterprises in the USSR and privately elsewhere (Leetmaa, et al., 2012). 
In the socialist systems, power and ideology were united through the state that conferred 
property rights in ways that are quite different from western notions and created a distinctive 
form of unitary housing system. The legacies of these socialist systems affect the way in 
which post-socialist systems evolved and should be interpreted. 
5. Ideology, power and the role of the state in post-socialist housing 
Given that the sudden collapse of political communism, it is unsurprising that the early years 
of transition were marked by a power vacuum amid ideological flux (Ekiert, 1991). Thus the 
stable conditions that are a prerequisite of housing regimes were absent. Countries that had 
been under one-party rule for decades began the process of engaging in a culturally unique 
and complex process of re-conceptualization of fundamental societal myths (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). 
The ideological vacuum also created room for effective lobbying in the field of housing 
policy by international aid organizations. The World Bank believed that housing was one of 
the least efficient elements in the socialist economy and became an advocate for the 
privatization of public and state-enterprise housing to promote efficiency (Jaffee and Renaud 
1996; Buckley et al. 1995). Accordingly, „the fall of communism offers policymakers a 
unique but fleeting opportunity to break the existing institutional political obstacles by 
irretrievably giving away the housing stock‟ (Buckley, et al. 1995: 65). Gradual reforms were 
dismissed as being unfeasible. The advice was emphatic: 
The surest and most efficient way to restore housing market equilibrium without 
creating additional distortions during the transition is to unwind totally the socialist 
housing legacy by eliminating all housing subsidies and the taxes that finance them 
and giving away the existing stock… equity concerns are not a legitimate obstacle to 
rapid market reforms (Buckley, et al., 1995: 74-75).  
And: 
Managing the transition toward markets requires the simultaneous pursuit of two very 
distinct sets of policies which should match the dualistic structure of the housing 
system. One set of policies is needed to privatize the large inefficient stock of public 
housing, and the other to encourage the rapid growth of the very small new private 
sector (Renaud, 1995: 39). 
The recommendation of privatisation to individual tenants marked a departure from the 
World Bank‟s (1993) generic advice, which did not specify the form of privatisation. Indeed 
a World Bank paper from the early post-socialist period that recommended a halt to 
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privatisation at sub-market prices, but instead advocated the marketization of the sector: 
raising rents to market levels, protecting poorer tenants with a housing allowance, and 
privatising management (World Bank, 1991). According to one former World Bank official 
many governments were already strongly committed to privatisation to individual tenants, 
and apart from the former DDR (that became part of the large and prosperous Federal 
Republic) there were unlikely to be private investors willing to invest in privatised housing 
and no non-profit landlords able to take on this task
2
. This would not have precluded 
marketization, and the advocacy of this strategy seems to have been abandoned quickly and 
replaced with an advocacy of giveaway privatization.  
Meanwhile, the municipalities and state-enterprises that owned the housing were in acute 
financial difficulties. Moreover, many governments were themselves poorly equipped to 
construct alternatives. Interviews with ministers, MPs and high-ranking policy makers which 
were conducted as part of a study of housing in the Czech Republic (Lux, 2009, pp.201-206) 
revealed that the new political elite systematically lacked knowledge about different policy 
options and decisions were – at least in the first decade – often taken without any deeper 
analysis of the situation. In most cases ad hoc solutions were applied instead of setting up 
long-term strategies (Lux and Mikeszová, 2012). The change was more spontaneous than 
intentional (Sýkora, 2003). A similar situation has also been identified in other post-socialist 
states (Hegedüs and Struyk, 2005; Tsenkova, 2009a).  
Nonetheless, whatever uncertainties surround the extent of the World Bank‟s influence, 
formal power lay with the post-communist governments.  Privatisation suited the pragmatic 
concerns of governments responsible for managing the wider and highly disruptive project of 
economic reform, which involved job losses, rising prices and insecurity that threatened 
stability. Rising energy prices leading to big increases in heating costs provided a further 
justification for holding down other housing–related costs. Giveaway privatization thus 
created secure, debt-free home-owners, and played a crucial role in offsetting declining living 
standards arising from economic restructuring. The housing sector was therefore widely 
employed as a „shock absorber‟ (Struyk, 1996; Hegedüs and Tosics, 1998). This 
interpretation is consistent with other (non-housing) accounts of post-socialist countries, for 
example Vanhuysse (2006) who identifies the widespread use of early retirement in Hungary 
and Poland as being part of a strategy to „divide and pacify‟ groups that might otherwise have 
provided a united and destabilising opposition to the new order. 
The result was in most cases national laws enacting mass „giveaway‟ privatization, with 
tenants becoming home-owners. The notable exceptions of Poland and the Czech Republic, 
where the decision was left to municipalities, led several scholars to speculate about a 
possible policy divergence in the future (Tsenkova and Turner, 2004). However, in practice 
the impact was much the same. The national governments in Poland and the Czech Republic 
retained key elements of pre-1990 tenancy rights along with rent control. So, although 
                                                          
2
 Email from Robert Buckley to Mark Stephens, 10 October 2013  
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municipalities could choose to retain ownership of housing, in practice this choice was 
rendered impractical by the removal of the effective means to manage and maintain it by 
raising sufficient rental income. In the Czech Republic, the share of public housing had 
decreased from 35 per cent in 1991 to 8 per cent of total housing stock by 2011; for Poland 
the respective figures are 32 per cent in 1991 and 8 per cent in 2011 (Hegedüs, et al., 2012). 
The way in which privatization replicated socialist-era inequalities has been demonstrated by 
Lux (2009) for the Czech Republic, Pichler-Milanovich (2001), and in more detail by 
Yemtsov (2007) for Russia, Serbia and Poland. Of course all former public tenants were 
made „richer‟, but the former nomenklatura became even „richer‟ due to the higher property 
values of their dwellings: 
It is obvious that housing privatization programs created winners and losers 
depending on where people happened to be living at the beginning of transition 
(Yemtsov, 2007: 10) … privatization universally, in all three countries favoured the 
rich … It therefore contributed to the increase of inequality (ibid: 23). 
Marcuse makes a similar point: 
… [privatization] is a question not of property rights development, but of the 
reallocation of already existing rights that have been lodged elsewhere in the past… 
with substantial and differential impacts on different groups in society (1996: 143). 
The privatization process reflected an ephemeral co-incidence of interests between the 
ideological predilections of the international agencies providing a convenient template for the 
pragmatic politics of stabilisation. Consequently, it did not mark the „transition‟ to a liberal 
housing market, but rather a process of „transformation‟ (Stark and Bruszt, 1998). It helps to 
explain why the dramatic change in legal tenure was accompanied by such muted changes in 
its fundamental nature. 
6. Ideology, power and the role of the market in post-socialist housing 
Within the new landscape of mass home-ownership, the development of housing finance 
institutions and housing markets would be key to defining the nature of the emerging housing 
systems. However, in contrast to privatization, the establishment of housing finance systems 
was not supported by a simple co-incidence of the ideology of international agencies and the 
demands of pragmatic politics. Instead there was competition between proponents of different 
housing finance models. External advisers were present, but so too were business interests, 
notably the German and Austrian banks. These had a „fundamental impact‟ on the new 
housing finance systems (Struyk, 2000: viii). 
Much US-led international advice conceived the future in terms of secondary market 
institutions facilitating securitisation (Jaffee and Renaud, 1996). In an environment of low 
demand for mortgages, an unstable (often publicly owned) banking sector, weakly 
established legal systems, flourishing clientelism and corruption, unreliable cadastres, non-
existent capital markets, some consultants saw the priority problem as being lack of liquidity 
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in the banking system, and aimed to skip the stage of first establishing a primary mortgage 
market. There was even the belief that the secondary mortgage market would naturally create 
the institutions required for a primary mortgage market (Jaffee and Renaud, 1996: 23). The 
view of the superiority of a system founded on securitization later became so deeply 
entrenched that an OECD official asserted that best practice involves: 
… a risk-based mortgage lending system supported by a securitisation scheme… with 
the removal of cost ineffective subsidy schemes and deposit based lending (Shinozaki, 
2005: 61). 
In reality, securitisation was pursued seriously only in Russia (and later in Ukraine). The 
principal attempt was made by USAID, whose work resulted in the establishment of a Fannie 
Mae-type agency – the Russian Federal Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending (AHML, also 
known as „Natasha Mae‟) – in 1996. The decision to create the facility was made after the 
commercial banks made it clear that they were unwilling to hold long-term debt and that 
„they would only increase the volume of such [mortgage] lending if there were a liquidity 
facility to refinance their loans‟ (Struyk and Kosareva, 1999: 29). As anticipated it did not 
begin to lend until systems had been established and the mortgage law (which until 1998 
prohibited repossession with vacant possession in the event of default) reformed. Progress 
was severely disrupted by the financial crisis of August-September 1998 (Struyk and 
Kosareva, 1999), and AHML did not purchase any loans until 1999 when it purchased five 
valued at $80,180 (Mints, 2000). 
There were other attempts to create secondary market facilities, including one promoted by a 
senior US Congressman. However, according to one senior advisor, this was no more than a 
„side show‟3, and AHML remains the key secondary market institution in Russia today. It has 
been attributed with contributing „to the rapid growth in mortgage lending‟ after 2005 
(Kosareva and Tumanov, 2012: 202), but this assessment must be placed in context. By 2010, 
Russia‟s mortgage debt stood 2.8 per cent of GDP, which although „28 times more than in 
2004‟ (ibid.: 202), was nonetheless the lowest of any of the post-socialist countries for which 
data are available (EMF, 2012). Although it pursued the most „financialized‟ mortgage 
strategy of any of the post-socialist countries, Russia emerged as having one of the least 
financialized housing systems. Chiquier et al (2004: 35) noted, „Simply creating a secondary 
market institution will not create a market,‟ but this is true of any financial model. Hence, 
Zavisca (2012) attributes the phenomenon of „property without markets‟ to cultural attitudes 
towards mortgages and tenure, as well as economic explanations based on market failure and 
affordability.  
A more complex picture emerged in central and south-east Europe, where German and 
Austrian banking interests were active. According to Struyk (2000) the emergence of contract 
savings schemes in many countries was attributable to the interaction of external commercial 
interests with popular demand mediated through parliaments:  
                                                          
3
 Email from Raymond Struyk to Mark Stephens, 9 November 2014 
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… it is not surprising that the Bausparkassen programs in all of the Visegrad countries 
were a parliamentary initiative. They were assiduously promoted by banking interests 
from Germany and Austria and typically opposed by the government (Struyk, 2000: 
54-55). 
However there were significant differences in the implementation of housing savings 
schemes. Those implemented in the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993 were similar to the 
German model. Hungary followed in 1997, Croatia in 1998, Romania in 2003 and Bulgaria in 
2004. Legislation was passed to allow for Bausparkassen in Poland, but they have not been 
introduced in practice. Slovenia introduced its own distinctive model of housing savings 
based on the existing banking sector. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, housing savings 
schemes became popular as general savings vehicles, in contrast to Hungary and Croatia, 
where they were more closely tied to house purchase.  
The complexity of the emerging housing finance institutions is confirmed by the mixture of 
publicly and privately owned, specialist and non-specialist institutions, operating alongside a 
variety of subsidy systems, including grants, interest subsidies and guarantees (Roy, 2008; 
Stephens, 2010). However, these institutional descriptions are uninformative as to the 
material character of post-socialist housing systems. It is also highly relevant that the creation 
of nations of largely debt-free home-owners meant that there was less urgency in the creation 
of housing finance systems. Demand for mortgage finance was further limited by the 
tendency of socialist cities to be over-supplied with mid-range properties (Lowe, 2003), low 
incomes (Stephens, 2005), and cultural resistance to debt (Zavisca, 2012). 
[Table 1] 
Using the indicators explained in section 3, Table 1 seeks to capture not just the extent to 
which owner-occupation has become dominant, but the way in which housing finance and 
housing markets have emerged to transform illiquid socialist systems into liquid financialized 
ones.   
The dominance of owner-occupation in post-socialist housing systems is clear: in no post-
socialist country home-ownership is owner-occupation below 80 per cent, whereas it is 
higher than this in only one country in southern or western Europe. Moreover, it is outright 
ownership that is prevalent throughout the region (Column A). In each of the 10 countries 
where data are available, at least 60 per cent of the population lives in houses that are owned 
without a mortgage. Among the sub-groups outright ownership is highest in SE Europe where 
it exceeds 80 per cent, but there is variation within groups. Only 11 per cent of the owner 
occupied population lives in homes on which a mortgage is secured, some 16 percentage 
points fewer than in Southern Europe (Column B). Among the post-socialist countries, 
mortgaged ownership is generally weakest in SE Europe (4%) and strongest in Central 
Europe (17%). There is some overlap between the most mortgaged home-owner sectors in 
Central Europe (Czech Republic and Hungary) and the least mortgaged home-owner sectors 
in Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta). The division between the post-
socialist and Southern European countries is more acute when the share of mortgage debt in 
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the economy is considered: only Italy and Hungary come close to overlapping (Column C). 
Among the corporatist countries, which have an even lower level of mortgage debt than the 
Southern European countries, only Austria has a level of mortgage debt that is close to the 
highest level among the post-socialist group.  
The indicators of housing as a source of (accumulating) and liquid wealth (columns D-F) are 
more difficult to judge. They are inherently less reliable and comparable, being affected by 
cycles that may not be synchronised and also by partial coverage. Nonetheless, the real house 
price index suggests growth in house prices since 2000 is comparable to the rest of Europe, 
notwithstanding a boom and bust in some countries. Real price volatility (measured by 
standard deviation) appears to be relatively high among the post-socialist countries, and 
cannot be explained by low levels of transactions as these appear to be high compared to 
most of the rest of Europe. So housing would appear to possess some of the attributes of an 
asset whose value generally grows, but is subject to much fluctuation. Moreover, although 
not „financialized‟ in terms of financing, transaction levels do suggest that housing is quite 
frequently traded. 
Interestingly, there is no coherent crystallisation between the indicators, for example between 
levels of mortgage debt and real house price appreciation, or between price appreciation and 
transactions. In contrast to Schwartz and Seabrooke‟s (2008), we find no consistent pattern 
has yet emerged, apart from the one clearly dominant and exceptional feature of these 
countries: the dominance of an owner-occupied sector unencumbered by mortgage debt. 
7. The role of the household 
With the role of the state greatly diminished (through privatization) and the role of the market 
seemingly chaotic, one would expect the role of household/ family to be greater. Mandic 
(2012) used European Quality of Life Survey data from 2003 to examine the links between 
home-ownership and family welfare in the EU-27. She hypothesises that extended family 
structures indicates „sharing household resources‟ (ibid.: 76), that mortgage-free ownership 
„indicates the presence of other [non-market] sources, coming from family and kinship – in 
monetary form or in kind‟ (ibid: 77), and establishes that high levels of home-ownership are 
an urban as well as rural phenomenon. We also attach importance to household structure, but 
employ a wider range of indicators. The association of mortgage-free ownership with „family 
and kinship‟ is surely questionable where privatisation has been so prevalent. Moreover, a 
broader range of sources is required to establish the role and nature of self-provision.   
Familialism  
Demographic indicators provide a valuable overview of inter-generational sharing of housing 
welfare. The data on forms of inter-generational households (Table 2) relate to urban areas in 
order to avoid comparisons that are distorted by different levels of urbanisation. 
[Table 2] 
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Among the „never socialist‟ EU countries, there is a broad relationship between household 
types and welfare regimes, when all five of these indicators are considered. The indicators 
identifying couples living with adult children and single older men and women living with 
others provide the strongest evidence of southern European familialism; the pattern is still 
present if less consistent among those identifying extended families in general and children 
aged under 18 living within an extended family. At the other extreme the social democratic 
countries, where the state is strongest in terms of welfare provision, the indicators suggest 
that familialism is weakest. 
As a whole the indicators support the hypothesis that familialism also plays an important role 
in the post-socialist countries. The pattern is clearest in the South East European countries. 
The average for these countries is higher than the Southern European average on all but one 
indicator. The prevalence of extended families is twice that of the Southern European 
countries and the proportion of children living in extended families is three times the 
Southern European average. The proportion of couples with adult children, and the 
proportion of elderly single men and women living with others are around the Southern 
European average. Within this group, Slovenia has lower proportions of extended families 
and children living in extended families, but the highest proportion of couples with adult 
children in this group.  
The pattern is less pronounced but nonetheless distinct in the four Central European 
countries. The proportions of extended families and couples with adult children are a little 
below the Southern European average, but the proportion of children living in extended 
families is one-third higher. The proportions of elderly single men and women living with 
others are substantially below the Southern European average, but still considerably higher 
than in almost all other EU member states. Of the countries in this group, the Czech Republic 
appears to exhibit the lowest levels of familialism. It has an even lower proportion of 
extended families than social democratic Sweden. However, the proportion of couples with 
adult children is more in line with the familialist „model‟, and the proportions of elderly 
single men and women living with others is higher than any of the west European countries 
other than Ireland. 
The indicators for the three Baltic states also reflect familialism. In the group as a whole there 
is a higher proportion of extended families and children living in extended families than in 
the Southern European group. Although there is a lower proportion of couples with adult 
children and elderly single men living with others than in the Southern European group, these 
are above the averages for other welfare regimes, and reflect a relatively late age of leaving 
home (Mandic, 2008). The proportion of elderly single women living with others is slightly 
higher than in the Southern European group. As with the Czech Republic, Estonia appears to 
be an outlier in that there are comparatively few extended families and very few children live 
in extended families, but familialism is suggested by other indicators. In Russia, an explicit 
pronatalist policy whereby housing vouchers are granted on the birth of the second child, 
represents a reassertion of a long-term concern with population decline (Zavisca, 2012; 
Wood, 2012).  
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[Figures 1-3]  
Cirman‟s (2008) study found that around one-quarter of Slovenian households who became 
home owners during 1991-2005 received financial assistance from their family. Evidence in 
the SHARE survey data (2010) fails to identify a consistent pattern of cash transfers between 
generations when financial gifts from people aged 50 or over to children or grandchildren is 
considered (Figure 1). However, when the question is narrowed to grandchildren, a clear 
pattern emerges, for transfers of relatively small amounts (250 or more in local currency) 
(Figure 2). Of the 16 countries included in the survey, five transition countries, two Southern 
countries and three Western (corporatist/ social democratic) countries appear in the top ten. 
Of the bottom six, five are western countries and one is Southern European. The pattern 
becomes less consistent when larger amounts (>5,000 in local currency) are considered 
(Figure 3). Three transition countries record the highest incidence of such gifts, but two 
transition and two southern European countries also record to lowest such incidences. 
Moreover, it is not certain how this can interpreted, especially as the question is not ideal: 
even when the same currency is used, €5,000 in a transition country is likely to represent a 
much more generous gift than in a western European country. Whilst it is not known whether 
such transfers are directed towards housing, it is probable that they are linked since Mandic 
and Cirman‟s (2012) analysis identified such transfers (unspecified in scale or purpose) to be 
one statistically significant structural explanation of housing outcomes.  
Whilst the data on cash gifts is supportive of the hypothesis that familialism is an important 
element of housing welfare in post-socialist Europe, the demographic data is compelling. All 
post-of these post-socialist countries exhibit much higher levels of inter-generational 
dependency in direct housing provision than in the social-democratic and corporatist 
countries. There is a continuum ranging from the Czech Republic, Estonia and to a lesser 
extent Lithuania which generally exhibit less inter-generational inter-dependence than is the 
case in Southern Europe. At the other end of the spectrum the South Eastern countries, 
especially Bulgaria and (on some indicators) Romania, exhibit a greater level of 
intergenerational interdependence. To borrow Iacovou and Skew‟s (2011) terminology, in 
some respects they form an „extreme‟ southern European group. Hungary and Poland lie 
somewhere in between. 
Self-build 
There is evidence that the environment whereby the state has retreated and efficient market 
institutions have yet to develop has allowed self-build housing to be a significant source of 
housing welfare in some post-socialist countries. However, the level of self-build varies 
greatly as does its nature.  
Statistics are sparse and the difficulty in distinguishing between different forms of self-
promoted housing in the west prevents benchmarking. Our survey of literature and experts 
suggests that self-build (where the family itself constructs at least part of the house) appears 
to be most prevalent in those countries where there is a legacy of self-build from the socialist 
period.  
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Tsenkova‟s report on south-east Europe suggests that 80 per cent of new housing is produced 
by private developers „mostly in the form of self-help‟ (2005: 69). Estimates for Romania 
based on the building materials commonly used in self-build housing suggest that 13 per cent 
of urban and 59 per cent of rural housing constructed between 1990 and 2002 were self-
built.
4
 In Slovenia, where statistics do exist, self-built housing accounts for 70 per cent of 
completions since 1990, although the share has fluctuated (between 89% in 1999 and 41% in 
2008).
5
 Palacin and Shelburne (2005) give a figure of 38 per cent of completions being self-
built in Hungary (in 2004). In contrast, there appears to be less self-build in the Czech 
Republic where only 4.5 per cent of 20-35 year olds reported acquiring their home through 
self-help in 2003
6
. However, in Estonia, Leetma, et al (2012) found that one-third of dachas 
around Tallin had become permanent homes, and more than half of them had been 
substantially renovated or replaced with new houses. Substantially upgraded dachas are also 
reported to be a feature of the outskirts of Russian cities.
7
  
The nature of self-built housing varies between countries and – even within the post-socialist 
period – over time. „Informal‟ settlement covers a range of housing and not only squatter 
settlements and run-down housing in city centres, but UNECE estimates that more than 50 
million people live in such housing in the 20 countries within its remit (Tsenkova, 2009b). 
While such housing is not exclusively in post-socialist Europe, it seems likely that most of it 
is. „Market‟ informal (i.e. illegal) self-development occurs, notably in cities such as Tirana 
where the urban population has grown rapidly, and in countries affected by the Yugoslav 
wars that caused widespread population displacement (ibid.). In these countries illegality 
combines with self-help to create a form of „anti-state housing.‟ It may be regularised later, as 
occurs in Albania where there were some 270,000 claims for legalisation in 2006 alone.
8
 
However, where land has been obtained legitimately, tax evasion is commonly associated 
with self-built housing, and contributes to its anti-state character.  
Soatia‟s (2013) observation, based on Romania, that self-built housing is increasingly 
associated with fulfilling aspirations to live in low density suburban housing, rather than 
fulfilling acute need is clearly quite widespread. For example, in Estonia, dacha housing was 
occupied on a permanent basis during the 1990s recession as a „reserve of affordable 
housing‟ (Leetma, et al, 2012: 18), but through widespread upgrading and even replacement, 
it has moved upmarket, and provided building plots for housing during the short boom of the 
mid-2000s. Self-build housing became an important element in some socialist countries, 
largely because of the state‟s ability to provide housing was limited. In a fundamental sense it 
is weaknesses in both market provision and of state regulatory (and sometimes legal) systems 
that allow self-build to flourish in many post-socialist countries. Although it reflects a 
                                                          
4
 Information provided by Adriana Soaita.  
5
 Information provided by Andreja Cirman. 
6
 Housing young generation survey, 2003 
7
 Information provided by Sasha Tsenkova.  
8
 Information provided by Doris Andoni.  
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panoply of path dependencies, it is consistent with the view that when state and market fail, 
the role of the household in the production of welfare becomes more prominent.  
 
8. Conclusions 
This article aimed to present an historically-grounded interpretation of post-socialist housing 
reform in Europe, employing a conceptual framework that combined the explanatory power 
of regime theory with the identification of the respective roles of the state, market and 
households in the provision of housing welfare. 
Acknowledging generalisation, and the areas where data are limited, the evidence nonetheless 
suggests the following interpretation. 
Socialist-era housing systems continue to exert a strong path dependency more than two 
decades after the collapse of communism. Their unique characteristic was a unitary tenure 
structure, whereby both state-rental housing and owner-occupied housing conferred very 
high levels of security with low levels of marketability. These sat within a framework which 
promoted the nuclear family, and in which allocation was predominantly non-market 
although „primitive‟ markets flourished, and these allowed for (variable) levels of aided self-
help housing. In contrast to the west, housing policy was, however, a deliberate source of 
reward and inequality. 
„Giveaway‟ privatization is the defining feature of post-socialist housing systems, marking a 
universal retreat of the state. It has created a distinctive cluster of housing systems that 
combined very high levels of homeownership („super-homeownership‟) and low levels of 
mortgage debt. The ultimate source of this welfare, however, is often the state, not the family 
as is the case in the idealised version of the southern European model. Although the state may 
have retreated, through privatization it has left behind a form of state legacy welfare.  
However, the (initial) distribution of housing remained (deliberately) unchanged to replicate 
socialist-era inequalities as part of the well-known shock-absorber strategy. Moreover, it 
remained non-financialized, so the (housing) market has remained underdeveloped as a 
source of asset-based welfare. Although an array of financial intermediaries and instruments 
has developed, and indicators of „financialization‟ are inconsistent, nowhere has a housing 
market developed that has transformed illiquid socialist tenure into consistently liquid assets. 
With weak markets, the scope for the household to become a source of housing welfare (by 
default) has become more pronounced. There is strong evidence to suggest very high levels 
of familialism (inter-generational support) in the form of extended families sharing housing, 
although there is also some evidence of cash and in-kind transfers. High levels of self-built 
housing suggest that housing welfare is created from within the family. Much self-built 
housing in south-east Europe is developed illegally and assumes the character of anti-state 
housing. Overt state-backed pro-natalist policy linked to housing appears to be confined to 
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Russia. Together, the highly path-dependent configurations of housing welfare is strongly 
suggestive of a process of „transformation‟ rather than „transition‟. 
A plausible (though hardly definitive) interpretation is that the co-incidence of the neo-liberal 
ideology of the international agencies and the pragmatic concerns of those in power that 
produced give-away privatisation was unstable, hence the apparent lack of coherence in the 
respective roles of markets and households. There remains no settled collective ideology to 
produce the kind of stable power structures gave rise to the western welfare regimes. Until 
these are attained, the post-socialist countries are likely to experience housing welfare 
regimes by default – in that no conscious decision beyond privatization has been taken – and 
their distinctive characteristics will remain a peculiar marriage of state legacy welfare, very 
high levels of intergenerational support and (at least in some countries) anti-state welfare. In 
the tradition of comparative welfare regime literature macro-level indicators have been 
employed in this study. As such it provides a conceptual framework that might form the basis 
for more detailed „system-embedded‟ (Stephens, 2011) studies that examine the sociology of 
these systems and focus on one or a small number of countries.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The article was prepared with assistance from a research project sponsored by the Czech 
Science Foundation (grant number P404/12/1446). The authors are indebted to Doris Andoni, 
Andreja Cirman, Andriana Soaita and Sasha Tsenkova for supplying information on self-
build housing. In addition to the comments received from the anonymous referees we are 
grateful to Robert Buckley and Raymond Struyk for discussions and comments on earlier 
drafts of the paper. Responsibility for the final version of the paper rests solely with the 
authors.  
 
 
References 
Alexeev, M. (1988). The effect of housing allocation on social inequality: a Soviet 
perspective, Journal of Comparative Economics 12: 228-34 
Allen, J (2006) „Welfare regimes, welfare systems and housing in southern Europe‟, 
European Journal of Housing Policy, 6(3): 251-277 
Allen, J, Barlow, J, Leal, J, Maloutas, T. and Padovani, L (2004) Housing and Welfare in 
Southern Europe, London: Blackwell Publishing 
Bambra, C (2007) „Going beyond “The three worlds of welfare capitalism”: regime theory 
and public health research‟, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 61(12): 1098-
1102 
21 
 
 Berger, P and Luckmann, T (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books  
Bodnár, J and Böröcz, J (1998). „Housing advantages for better connected?‟, Social Forces, 
76: 1275-1304 
Buckley, R, Hendershott, P and Villani, K (1995) „Rapid housing privatization in reforming 
economies: pay the special dividend now‟, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 
10: 63-80  
Buckley. R and Tsenkova, S (2001) „Housing Market Systems in Reforming Socialist 
Economies: comparative indicators of performance and policy‟, European Journal of 
Housing Policy, 11(2): 257-289 
Castles, F. G. (1998) The really big trade-off: home ownership and the welfare state in the 
new world and the old„, Acta Politica 33(1): 5-19 
Chiquier, L, Hassler, O and Lea, M (2004) Mortgage Securities in Emerging Markets, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3370, Washington DC: World Bank 
Cirman, A (2008) „Intergenerational transfers as a response to changes in the housing market 
in Slovenia‟, European Journal of Housing Policy 8(3): 303-315 
Crompton, R (1998) Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Current Debates, 
Cambridge: Policy Press 
Doling, J (1997) Comparative Housing Policy, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Doling, J. & Horsewood, N. 2011. Home ownership and pensions: causality and the really 
big trade-off. Housing, Theory and Society 28, 2, 166-182 
Donnison, D (1967) The Government of Housing, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Donnison, D and Ungerson, C (1982) Housing Policy, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Ekiert, G (1991) „Democratization process in East Central Europe: a theoretical 
reconsideration‟, British Journal of Political Science, 21: 285-313 
Emms, P (1990) Social Housing: a European dilemma?, Bristol: SAUS 
Epstein, G (2005) Financialization and the World Economy, Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar 
Esping-Andersen, G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity 
Press 
European Mortgage Federation (2012) Hypostat, Brussels: EMF 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila (1999) Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary lives in extraordinary times: Soviet 
Russia in the 1930s, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
22 
 
Fitzpatrick, Suzanne and Stephens, M (2014) „Welfare Regimes, Social Values and 
Homelessness: Comparing responses to Marginalised Groups in Six European Countries‟, 
Housing Studies 29(2): 215-234 
Harris, R (1999) „Aided self-help housing: a case of amnesia‟, Housing Studies, 14(3): 277-
280 
Hegedüs, J, Lux, M and Teller, N (eds) (2012) Social Housing in Post-Socialist Countries, 
New York: Routledge 
Hegedüs, J and Tosics, I (1998) „Rent Reform – Issues for Countries of Eastern Europe and 
the Newly Independent States‟, Housing Studies, 13: 657-658  
Hegedüs, J and Struyk, RJ (eds.) (2005) Housing Finance. New and Old Models in Central 
Europe, Russia, and Kazakhstan, Budapest: LGI/OSI 
Hegedüs, J, Tosics, I, Mayo, SK (1996) „Transition of the Housing Sector in the East Central 
European Countries‟, Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies, 8: 101-136 
Jaffee, D and Buckley, R (1996) Strategies to develop mortgage markets in transition 
economies, Washington DC: World Bank 
Iacovou, M and Skew, A (2011) „Household Composition in the New Europe‟, Demographic 
Research, 25(14): 465-490 
Kemeny, J (1995) From Public Housing to the Social Market: Rental policy strategies in 
comparative perspective, London: Routledge 
Kemeny, J. 2005. “The really big trade-off” between home ownership and welfare: Castles‟ 
evaluation of the 1980 thesis, and a reformulation 25 years on. Housing, Theory and 
Society 22 (2) 59-75 
Kemeny, J. (2001) Comparative housing and welfare: Theorising the relationship, Journal of 
Housing and the Built Environment, 16(1), pp. 53–70 
 
Kemeny, J and Lowe, S (1998) „Schools of comparative housing research: from convergence 
to divergence‟, Housing Studies, 13(2): 161-176 
Kornai, J (1992) The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Kurz, K and Blossfeld, H (eds) (2004) Home ownership and social inequality in comparative 
perspective, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Leetmaa, K, Brade, I, Anniste, K and Nuga, M (2012), „Socialist summer-home settlements 
in Post-socialist Suburbanisation‟, Urban Studies, 49(1): 3-21 
23 
 
Lowe, S (2003) „Introduction: housing in post-communist Europe: issues and agendas‟, in 
Lowe, S and Tsenkova, S (eds) Housing Change in East and Central Europe: Integration 
or Fragmentation?, xiii-xix, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Lux, M (2009) Housing Policy and Housing Finance in the Czech Republic during 
Transition, Amsterdam: Delft University Press 
Lux, M and Mikeszová, M (2012) „Property Restitution and Private Rental Housing in 
Transition: The Case of the Czech Republic‟, Housing Studies, 27 (1): 77-96 
Mandic, S (2008) „Home-leaving and its structural determinant in Western and Eastern 
Europe: An exploratory study‟, Housing Studies 23(4): 615-637 
Mandic, S (2010) „The changing role of housing assets in post-socialist countries‟, Journal of 
Housing and the Built Environment, 25(2): 213-226 
Mandic, S. (2012) „Home ownership in post-socialist countries: between macro economy and 
micro structures of welfare provision‟, in R. Ronald and M. Elsinga (eds) Beyond Home 
Ownership: Housing, Welfare and Society, London, Routledge: 68-88 
Mandic, S and Cirman, A (2012) „Housing conditions and their structural determinants: 
Comparisons within the enlarged EU‟, Urban Studies, 49(4): 777-793 
Marcuse, P (1996) „Privatization and its discontents: property rights in land and housing in 
the transition in eastern Europe‟ in Andrusz, G, Harloe, M and Szelenyi, I (eds.) Cities after 
Socialism, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 119-191 
Mints, V (2000) „Selecting a housing finance system for Russia‟, Housing Finance 
International, December: 49-57 
Norris, M and Stephens, M (2014) „Introduction. Strengthening the Conceptua and 
Methodological Foundations of Comparative Housing Research‟ in Stephens, M and 
Norris, M (eds) Meaning and Measurement in Comparative Housing Research, London: 
Routledge, pp. 1-9 
North, DC and Weingast, BR (1989) „Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of 
institutional governing public choice in seventeenth-century England‟, Journal of Economic 
History, 49(4): 803-832 
Palacin, J and Shelburne, R (2005) The Private Housing Market in Eastern Europe and the 
CIS, Geneva: UN Economic Commission for Europe 
Pichler-Milanovic, N (2001) „Urban Housing Markets in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Convergence, Divergence or Policy „Collapse“?‟, European Journal of Housing Policy, 1: 
145-187. 
24 
 
Rákosník, J. (2010) Sovětizace sociálního státu: lidově demokratický režim a sociální práva 
občanů v Československu 1945-1960 [The sovietisation of welfare state: people-democratic 
regime and social rights of citizens in Czechoslovakia 1945-1960]. Prague: Charles 
University 
Renaud, B (1995) „Housing finance in transition economies. The early years in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union,‟ Housing Finance International, December: 35-46  
Ronald, R. (2008) The Ideology of Home Ownership. Homeowner Societies and the Role of 
Housing, Palgrave Macmillan 
Ronald, R. and M. Elsinga (eds.) (2011) Beyond Home Ownership. Housing, Welfare and 
Society, London: Routledge 
Roy, F (2008) „Mortgage Markets in Central and Eastern Europe – a review of past 
experiences and future perspectives‟, European Journal of Housing Policy, 8(2): 133-160 
Saraceno, C and Keck, W (2010) „Can we identify intergenerational policy in Europe?‟ 
European Societies 12(5): 675-696 
Schwartz, H and Seabrooke, L (2008) „Varieties of Residential Capitalism in the International 
Political Economy: Old Welfare States and the New Politics of Housing, Comparative 
European Politics, 6: 237-261 
Shinozaki, S (2005) „A comparative assessment of housing finance markets in Transition 
Economies‟, in OECD (ed) Housing Finance Markets in Transition Economies, OECD: 
Paris: 7-81 
Smith, M (2010) Property of Communists: The urban housing program from Stalin to 
Khruschev, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press 
Soaita, AM (2013) „Romanian Suburban Housing: Home Improvement through Owner-
building‟, Urban Studies, 50(10): 2084-2101 
Stark, D and Bruszt L (1998) Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in 
East Central Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Stephenson, S (2006) Crossing the line: vagrancy, homelessness and social displacement in 
Russia, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Stephens, M (2005) „A Critical Analysis of Housing Finance reform in a “super-
homeownership” state: the case of Armenia‟, Urban Studies, 42(1): 1,795-1,815 
Stephens, M (2010) „Locating urban Chinese housing policy in an international context‟, 
Urban Studies, 47(14): 2965-2982 
25 
 
Stephens, M (2011) „Comparative Housing Research: a “system-embedded” approach‟, 
International Journal of Housing Policy, 4(11):337-355 
Stephens, M and van Steen, G (2011) „“Housing Poverty” and Income Poverty in England 
and the Netherlands‟, Housing Studies, 26(7–8):1035–1057 
Struyk, R (1996) Economic Restructuring of the Former Soviet bloc: The Case of Housing, 
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press  
Struyk, R (2000) „Introduction‟ in Struyk, R (ed.) Homeownership and Housing Finance 
Policy in the Former Soviet Bloc: Costly Populism, Washington DC: The Urban Institute: 
vii-xiii 
Struyk, R and Kosareva, NB (1999) „Natasha Mae: First Secondary Facility in the Former 
Soviet Bloc,‟ Housing Finance International, May: 29-36 
Sýkora, L (2003) „Czech Republic‟ in Lux, M (ed.) Housing Policy: an End or a New 
Beginning, Budapest: LGI/OSI: pp. 47-117 
Szelenyi, I (1983) Urban inequalities under state socialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Tsenkova, S (2005) Trends and progress in Housing Reforms in South Eastern Europe, Paris: 
Council of Europe 
Tsenkova, S (2009a) Housing Policy Reforms in Post Socialist Europe. Lost in Transition, 
Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag 
Tsenkova, S (2009b) Self-Made Cities, New York and Geneva: UN Economic Commission 
for Europe 
Tsenkova, S and Turner, B (2004) „The Future of Social Housing in Eastern Europe: Reforms 
in Latvia and Ukraine‟, European Journal of Housing Policy, 4: 133-149 
Vanhuysse, P (2006) Divide and Pacify, Budapest: CEU Press 
Večerník, J and Matějů, P (eds.) (1999) Ten Years of Rebuilding Capitalism. Czech Society 
after 1989, Prague: Academia 
Wood, T (2012) „Russia vanishes‟, London Review of Books, 34(23): 39-4 
World Bank (1991) Housing Policy Reform in Hungary, Report No. 9031-HU, Washington 
DC: World Bank 
World Bank (1993) Making Markets Work, Washington DC: World Bank 
Yemtsov, R (2007) Housing privatization and household wealth in transition. Research Paper 
No. 2007/02, United Nations University UNU-WIDER 
Zavisca, JR (2010) Housing the New Russia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
26 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of Housing and Mortgage Markets  
 A Outright Ownership (%, 
2011) 
B Mortgaged Ownership 
(%, 2011) 
C Mortgage Debt: GDP (%, 
2011) 
D Real house price index 
(2000=100) 
E Real house price 
volatility (St.Dev.) 
F Transactions as % owner 
stock (2000-2011) 
G Notes 
Liberal ave. 30.9 38.3 81.1 105 9.2 6.6  
Ireland 35.7 34.6 83.5 73 11.7 6.0 F: 2000-10 
United Kingdom 26.0 41.9 83.7 154 8.3 6.4 F: 2006-11 
United States - [66.1] 76.1 89 7.6 7.4 B: total owner stock 
Social democratic ave. 14.5 55.0 82.0 137 5.8 4.5  
Denmark 14.4 52.7 100.9 112 9.6 4.6  
Finland  32.2 41.9 42.7 137 4.0 3.8 F: 2008-11 
Netherlands 7.6 59.6 106.2 127 5.6 4.8  
Sweden 3.7 65.9 78.1 170 4.0 4.8  
Corporatist ave. 30.1 31.3 40.7 138 4.5 3.2  
Austria 31.8 25.7 27.8 100 2.6 - D,E: 2001-11 
Belgium 29.9 41.9 47.2 185 7.9 3.1  
France 33.7 29.4 42.4 175 6.3 3.9  
Germany 25.3 28.1 45.3 91 1.3 2.7  
Southern ave. 55.0 21.9 50.8 116 7.1 2.8  
Cyprus 58.5 15.3 71.3 133 11.2 - D,E: 2003-11 
Greece 60.1 15.7 36.4 84 9.2 3.2 F: 2002-10 
Italy 57.3 15.6 22.9 133 3.5 1.8  
Malta 63.1 17.7 45.2 126 8.0 -  
Portugal 41.0 34.0 66.6 91 2.4 3.0 F: 2000-10 
Spain 49.8 32.9 62.1 129 8.2 3.1  
Transition ave. 76.2 9.9 17.5 141 17.6 4.7  
SE Europe ave. 83.8 3.3 10.6 149 14.8 3.4  
Bulgaria 85.7 1.5 11.7 159 19.5 3.1  
Romania 96.0 0.6 5.5 - - 5.8 F: 2005-11 
Slovenia 69.8 7.7 14.5 138 10.1 1.3 D,E: 2004-10; F: 2008; 
2010-11 
Central European ave. 71.1 14.5 18.2 128 15.2 3.5  
Czech Republic 61.9 18.1 13.0 160 10.8 -  
Hungary 66.7 23.1 22.5 95 13.0 4.5  
Slovakia 82.0 8.2 17.8 128 16.3 - D,E: 2003-10 
Poland 73.7 8.4 19.6 129 20.7 2.5 F: 2002 only 
Baltic State ave. 75.5 10.6 28.7 142 26.0 7.0  
Estonia 66.9 16.7 36.7 163 25.7 8.0 D,E: 2002-11 
Latvia 74.2 8.3 30.0 121 26.3 5.9 F: 2000-05 
Lithuania 85.5 6.7 19.3 - - - D,E: 2002-08 
Russia - [84.0] 2.6 179 15.8 6.3 B: total owner stock; F: 
2010-11 
Notes:  A; B: individuals, except USA and Russia = % stock; B: [xx] excluded from averages; A-F: all averages unweighted (i.e. do not account for population size) 
Source: A; B: EU-SILC, except USA and Russia = EMF (2012), Table 4; C: EMF (2012), Table 1; D; E: calculated from EMF (2012) tables 11, 28; F: calculated from EMF (2012), tables 4, 5, 9  
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Table 2. Household Characteristics (densely-populated areas)  
 Extended and other Children (<18) living in 
extended family 
Couple with adult 
child(ren) 
Single men (65+) living 
with others  
Single women (65+) living 
with others 
Liberal ave. 7.5 5.2 11.6 22.2 20.0 
Ireland 10.3 4.4 13.8 32.1 24.5 
United Kingdom 4.6 5.9 9.3 12.3 15.5 
United States - - - - - 
Social democratic ave. 2.2 3.7 5.3 7.6 5.1 
Denmark 2.6 9.9 2.8 1.8 2.3 
Finland  0.7 0.8 4.7 10.9 5.2 
Netherlands
1 
2.2 1.5 9.1 9.7 5.3- 
Sweden 3.4 2.5 4.5 7.9 7.6 
Corporatist ave. 3.5 10.1 8.1 8.1 12.0 
Austria 4.4 18.7 9.0 9.8 12.9 
Belgium 4.4 14.6 8.4 7.5 15.8 
France 3.9 6.9 8.0 12.0 11.8 
Germany 1.1 0.0 6.8 2.9 7.3 
Southern ave. 6.1 8.8 21.0 38.6 39.0 
Cyprus 5.7 2.4 24.0 41.6 36.3 
Greece 5.7 6.3 20.1 40.9 41.4 
Italy 4.7 5.3 18.4 26.9 30.1 
Malta 5.3 2.2 27.1 35.0 41.4 
Portugal 6.4 22.5 16.0 46.6 36.2 
Spain 8.5 14.1 20.6 40.8 48.7 
Transition ave. 8.9 16.3 18.8 26.9 36.9 
SE Europe ave. 12.4 25.7 23.2 36.9 42.5 
Bulgaria 15.6 35.3 21.6 44.3 49.3 
Romania 13.1 29.5 22.8 24.4 38.1 
Slovenia1 8.4 12.2 25.1 41.9 40.2 
Central European ave. 5.9 12.0 18.9 19.4 30.6 
Czech Republic 3.1 3.6 16.0 14.5 23.8 
Hungary 7.5 18.1 14.6 27.1 34.6 
Slovakia 6.6 8.8 26.7 14.9 36.3 
Poland 6.4 17.6 18.1 21.2 27.5 
Baltic State ave. 9.4 12.7 14.3 26.9 39.8 
Estonia 4.3 1.5 12.2 22.1 32.4 
Latvia 14.8 29.8 12.6 32.2 49.3 
Lithuania 9.1 6.7 18.0 26.5 37.6 
Note 1: whole country 
Source: EU-SILC, 2009 
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Figure 1. Proportion of respondents who provided financial gift to children or grandchildren >250 (local currency) 
 
Source: SHARE, Wave 4 
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Figure 2. Proportion of respondents who provided financial gift to grandchildren >250 (local currency) 
 
Source: SHARE, Wave 4 
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Figure 3. Proportion of respondents who provided financial gift to grandchildren >5,000 (local currency) 
 
Source: SHARE, Wave 4 
 
